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ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to the analysis of policy making processes in the Irish
context. It offers original insights into recent policy changes in Irish activation
and social housing policy which, over the period of austerity, were subject
to significant institutional reshaping and structural reforms including
marketisation. A three I’s framework tracing the interaction of key ideas,
institutions and interests isolates dynamics informing the implementation of
marketisation in these sectors and allows insights into how policy is shaped
by key variables including markets, civil society and international actors.
Attention is drawn to the different pathways to, and implementation of,
marketisation in the different sectors. Marketisation reforms were largely
implemented in PES and activation reforms, but marketisation pathways had
different fortunes when it came to meeting social housing need. The paper
explores why this is the case and suggests issues of scale and degrees of
financialisation are important factors informing different pathways to and
experiences of marketisation of social policy, with, in both sectors, important
consequences for social policy and human rights. Issues of ideology,
centralisation, international f(actors), timing and scale are important variables
in shaping different pathways to marketisation with consequences for
likelihood of political resistance to such processes.
KEYWORDS Marketisation; Ireland; ideas; institutions; interests; social policy
1. Introduction
This paper contributes to the analysis of Irish policy making processes in the
Irish context with original insights into recent policy changes in Irish activation
and social housing policy. Using a three I’s framework to trace the interaction
of key ideas, institutions and interests we isolate dynamics informing two key
policy decisions over the period 2012–2016 and compare the politics of mar-
ketisation across the two sectors. Following Hall and Taylor (1996) and Hay
(2004), the three I’s framework privileges neither institutions, interests nor
ideas as the driving forces of change but examines the interaction of the
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three variables to isolate how different forms of power are utilised in inter-
national and domestic decision-making processes and across different
stages of the policy cycle and the political cycle. This gives us insight into
recent processes of public sector institutional reform in Ireland and how
they were shaped by different types of variables, ideas, interests and insti-
tutions, including markets, civil society and international actors. The Irish
welfare state, in common with welfare states across Europe, is confronted
with a number of crucial challenges (Murphy & Dukelow, 2016). Over the
economic crisis Ireland experienced significant spending cuts. Economic col-
lapse saw unemployment rise from 4% to 15% alongside increased poverty
and a range of negative social impacts (Hardiman & Regan, 2012). Alongside
this, social disinvestment in housing sparked a severe social housing crisis
and, for the first time, a significant family homelessness crisis (Dublin Regional
Homeless Executive [DHRE], 2017). Over the period, labour activation or public
employment services (PES) and social housing policy were subject to signifi-
cant institutional reshaping and structural reforms including marketisation.
Delivery in both sectors was marketised through use of various mechanisms
including pay by results, commissioning, tendering, private sector rental sub-
sidies and tax incentives, and use of public-private partnerships (Murphy &
Dukelow, 2016; Norris & Byrne, 2016). This paper is concerned with the
internal dynamics shaping these two examples of recent Irish welfare state
change and marketisation, and the differing experiences of pathways to,
and implementation of, marketisation (Elsinga, Stephens, & Knorr-Siedow,
2014). Following Shearer, Abelson, Kouyaté, Lavis, andWalt (2016), we use pro-
cess tracing in a comparative case study utilising policy documents and in-
depth interview data to examine the two cases. Essentially marketisation
reforms were largely implemented for both PES reforms and social housing,
but marketisation pathways have had consequences for social rights in
both cases.
The first case concerns the institutional reform of labour activation policy
(PES) including the development of new quasi-markets for PES (Taylor, Rees,
& Damm, 2016). The second case refers to the reform of private rental sub-
sidies from a residual or secondary policy towards a primary marketised
model of social housing provision. We proceed by outlining how we use
and understand key concepts and our conceptual and methodological
approach (Section 2). We then discuss the key changes to labour activation
(Section 3) and social housing policy (Section 4). We follow this by outlining
institutional (Section 5), ideational (Section 6) and interest (Section 7) based
accounts of change in both policy areas. Section 8 discusses key obser-
vations on the different pathways to marketisation in both sectors. Finally
we conclude issues of centralisation, international, timing and scale are
important variables in shaping different pathways to marketisation.
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2. Conceptual framework and methodology
We first conceptually clarify our use of distinct terms utilised in the paper,
namely privatisation, marketisation and quasi-markets and financialisation.
We avoid using these distinct terms as interchangeable but do see them as
interrelated, one process can lead to another, for example quasi- markets
can shift to full marketisation or ultimately financialisation. Privatisation, or
asset disposal, occurs when the state’s ownership of corporate entities is (par-
tially) reduced (Hermann, 2007). For the purposes of this paper we understand
marketisation as a trend towards using an open price mechanism to operatio-
nalise supply and demand. This occurs when welfare is commoditised and
given a market value, as occurred internationally with both social housing
and activation services (Elsinga et al., 2014; Grover, 2009; OECD, 2009). We
understand quasi-markets as planned and internal public sector institutional
structures that have some market features but where state imperatives
enable or restrict the extent of its full functioning (Wiggan, 2015). The
process can entail use of outscourcing, commissioning and procurement, con-
cessions, delegated management contracts, service level agreements (SLAs)
leasing, and PPPs. Market concepts like competition can also be implanted,
through new public management techniques, into the public sector trans-
forming how welfare is delivered and paid for (Greve, 2015). The financialisa-
tion process, understood as the expansion of financial markets, agents and
motives (Epstein, 2005) was actively promoted by European integration. van
der Zwan (2014) describes how intensification of finance and capital flows
means increased influence of global capital on national priorities as seen in
new regimes of accumulation, shareholder value orientation and the financia-
lisation of everyday life, all three are features of the Irish housing system and
policy (Hearne, 2017).
The financialised form of globalisation is of great significance in a small open
economy over-dependant on foreign direct investment. However finance is
mediated in different ways into domestic policies and is a more salient driver
in somewelfare areas than others (Murphy & Dukelow, 2016). The crisis is associ-
ated with a marked intensification in Ireland of quasi-markets in, not only acti-
vation and housing, but also in policy debates concerning water, health and
pensions. The overall ideational preference of the state is for enhancing
market led welfare provisions however not all policy decisions to create quasi-
markets succeed; Irish proposals for a private universal health care system
failed to progress and attempts to fully commodify water policy were aban-
doned (Murphy & Dukelow, 2016). Much can be learned about how marketisa-
tion is shaped and progresses in different social policy sectors (Koppe, 2012).
The Irish welfare state is hybrid in nature. While frequently classified as
liberal with strong market reliance, it also exhibits strong secondary Chris-
tian-democratic principles associated with Catholicism, corporatism and
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mixed delivery of welfare services (Ferragina & Seelieb-Kaiser, 2011). This
history of liberal and mixed delivery of welfare might suggest Irish welfare
was a likely candidate for marketisation of welfare services, but how might
this happen in different sectors? Explaining or understanding complex
policy change like marketisation requires integration of multiple policy the-
ories. Following Shearer et al. (2016, p. 1200) we use the ‘3Is’ as a theory of
policy change to explain the dynamics of marketisation essentially incorporat-
ing all possible explanatory variables’within the ‘3Is’ framework. The approach
Table 1 (below) involves distilling accounts of policy change frameworks into
three key elements, or explanatory variables known as the ‘3Is: formal and
informal domestic and international institutions (rules of the game including
processes, context and policy path dependence); interests (domestic and
international actors, preferences and power resources) and ideas (domestic
and international content, evidence, expert knowledge, framing, values, and
norms), (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hay, 2004; Pomey et al., 2010; Shearer et al.,
2016). Interests, ideas and institutions are over-arching categorical variables,
within which substantive variables such as international actors or institutions
and rights or markets discourses can be located. This framework is applicable
at all stages of the policy cycle, we attempt to apply from the point of policy
formulation over a stage of policy making and a range of the process. Such
application to a non-static policy process is challenging, the policy cycle is
not linear as policy science might suggest. We proceed to trace key features
of marketisaiton in both sectors drawing from document analysis and a range
of qualitative interviews with policy and delivery actors in both sectors which
took place over 2017 and 2018.
3. Creating markets for public employment services
From 1985 Irish PES were delivered through a quasi-autonomous government
organisation FÁS, the national training authority. While in theory a national
Table 1. Timelines and pathways in two activation and social housing sectors.
Theme PES Social housing
Proposed change Activation and quasi
market
Shift to HAP and use of market
Status quo at start of process State only PES actor State primary social housing provider
Policy discussion date/ref Pathways to Work 2012–
2016
JobPath tender 2012
Social Housing Supply Support Refor (2014),
HAP pilot (2014), Rebuilding Ireland (2016)
Institutions and governance
domestic international
Troika, Labour Market
Council, DSP/DEASP
Dept of Environment, Dept of Housing, Local
Authorities
Interests and actors,
domestic international
Bureaucrats, NGOs, NESC,
OECD
SLA contractors, CIF, REITS
Ideas domestic international Rights, Obligations,
Commissioning
Right to a Home
Market efficiency
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PES, FÁS focused on providing direct services for the unemployed and a range
of active labour market programmes. Boyle (2005) likened FÁS to a Swiss Army
knife, able to deliver a myriad of functions but performing none of them par-
ticularly well. Its lack of functional employment services failed to win the confi-
dence of employers who preferred to use the services of privatised
recruitment services and agencies. However it also failed to effectively
engage unemployed people with appropriate supports leading the OCED
(Grubb, Singh, & Tergeist, 2009) and McGuinness, O’Connell, Kelly, and
Walsh (2011) to label Ireland a ‘laggard’ in relation to activation. The pressure
of the economic crisis overlapped with a FÁS corporate governance scandal
giving a unique activation reform opportunity for various actors, particularly
the Department of Social Protection (DSP) (Dukelow, 2016; O’Connell, 2016).
The primary crisis period innovation in Irish labour activation was Pathways
to Work (PTW) 2012–16 (Department of Social Protection [DSP], 2012) which
merged DSP income supports and FÁS employment services into a new state-
led PES Intreo. The major reform occurred in the context of a six-fold increase
in claimants and consequent acute pressure to provide both PES and income
supports. The significant reform redeployed 1,300 civil servants into DSP, and
merged 700 FÁS personnel and functions into DSP along with the incorpor-
ation of 1,000 additional Community Welfare Officer’s (CWO’s). Over four
years 60 new one-stop-shop type local Intreo offices were opened with
merged income supports and PES functions, this was supported by refurbish-
ment, new IT systems, training, and cultural change programmes (O’Connell,
2016). While issues of culture, competence and capacity remain, it is recog-
nised that the scale of reform was historically immense in the Irish context
with key output targets realised over the reform period (Martin, 2014;
NESC, 2013).
We draw attention here to three forms of marketisation evident in Irish PES.
The first and most obvious marketisation strategy centred on the deliberate
construction of quasi-markets in PES. To meet ongoing capacity and alleviate
pressure on activation services a Pay by Results private delivery model
JobPath was first mooted in 2011 and became a reality in 2015. JobPath,
PES for the long term unemployed, was created by direct tendering of PES
delivery contracts to international prime companies. The speed of implemen-
tation far exceeded the pace of privatisation in UK and Australia causing
anxiety for some that it was too quick. Given fears the Irish market might
not be sufficiently large to attract primes, contracts were shared between
two private sector companies with near monopoly like delivery responsibility
for half the country each. Wiggan (2015) notes that the quasi-market contract
for these services was a marked improvement on the UK Work Programme
and contained elements of social democratic policy and practice, however
recent government analysis questions the lack of evidence base for evaluating
PES (Lavelle & Callaghan, 2018), there have been less sustainable employment
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outcomes than anticpated. Privatisation was challenged by two public sector
unions however the Civil Service Arbitration Board ruled DSP had followed
adequate consultative procedures to outsource services. The challenge pro-
voked little public reaction and JobPath originally proceeded with little fuss,
albeit by 2018 there were signiifcant concerns about welfare conditinality
and sanctions, transparency, data protection and value for money such that
in 2019 a parliamentary motion called for its aboliiton (Oireachtas, 2019).
This process of outsourcing to the private sector is nowhere near financialisa-
tion, but internationally, employment services are the subject of the ‘post-
Fordist search for new capitalist markets’, albeit not to the scale as is possible
in housing markets (Grover, 2015).
A second form of marketisation of activation was the application of com-
missioning processes, tendering and SLAs to replace traditional block grant
funding models used with not-for-profits delivering activation and commuity
dvelopment related services. This occurred through a 2015 commissioning
process for the Social Inclusion Community Activation Programme and
through shifts from block grants to Service Delivery Agreements for Local
Employment Services and Jobs Clubs (Meade, 2017). These measures were
and remain controversial and interviews suggest that, consistent with experi-
ence in the UK, commissioning is associated with shifts towards a competition
culture in sectors that were strongly collaborative (Taylor et al., 2016). It is
anticipated that Local Employment Services and Job Clubs will travel
further along the path of quasi marketisation and come under a pay-by-
results regime in 2020. In January 2019 DEASP announced plans to issue a
new Request for Tender for PES for both the long-term unemployed and
those more distant from the labour market. In 2017 these quasi-market
forms of PES (Job Path, LES, and SICAP) amount to €165m per annum of cor-
porate welfare spread across both profit and not for profit sectors. Interviews
suggest funding uncertainty and vulnerability has impacted on organisational
moral, work conditions and quality of services, particularly amongst smaller
community based organisations. The third form of marketisation is the
choice of the state to continue to deliver only a residual PES ring-fenced for
the use of job seeker claimants, leaving the wider function of employment ser-
vices to the market and to national and international private sector recruit-
ment agencies who turned over €1.73 billion in 2013 (Taylor, 2015). While
under pressure from direct online and platform recruitment, having recovered
from a recession slump, the sector is buoyant. Such agencies, through the
National Recruitment Federation of Ireland, play direct and indirect roles in
Irish labour market policy, lobbying on labour legislation, determining who
gets jobs and in particular influencing the balance to which labour and
skills needs or shortages are addressed through indigenous labour supply
or migrant labour.
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4. Creating markets for social housing
Bentgsson (2001) reminds us that housing can be distinguished from other
welfare policies to the degree that the state is rarely the main mechanism
of housing distribution. Housing has always been understood as an individual
market commodity while also as a public good demanding state investment
and regulation. The Irish state traditionally played a significant role in the
delivery of social housing for both rent and ownership. While the policy has
shifted over decades the adoption of the market as the primary mechanisms
to deliver Irish social housing is made very explicit in recent housing policy.
Throughout most of the twentieth century the Irish state played a central
role in the provision of state-supported socialised home ownership with a
`protected’ social complement to the general housing market (Bentgsson,
2001). From as early as the 1970s the Irish state had shifted towards market
delivery opting to secure some market provision of social housing through
PPP’s (Hearne, 2017) and increased use of private rental subsidies. The first
private rental subsidy the 1974 Rent Supplements (RS) was understood pri-
marily as a short term income support and administered by the DSP.
However by 2003 a Rental Assistance Schemes (RAS) was introduced as a
social housing support administered by the local authorities. The global
financial crisis impacted significantly causing inter alia, a house price crash
and the collapse of the housing market along with a growth in numbers
waiting for social housing and a sharp rise in family homelessness as an aus-
terity regime decimated the capital budget for social housing construction
reducing it by 80%. We draw attention here to three pathways to marketisa-
tion of Irish social housing policy.
Overall we see what Minton (2016) describes as a shift from ‘bricks to
benefits’ with significant disinvestment in direct build social housing from
8,794 social housing units in 1975, 5,559 in 2005 to only 75 in 2015 (Hearne
& Murphy, 2017). Since 2011 private rental subsidies have shifted from sec-
ondary to primary social housing delivery mechanisms. The key document
Social Housing Strategy 2020 Support, Supply and Reform (Department of
Housing Environment and Local Government [DHELG], 2014, p. 5) committed
the State to a central role in the direct provision of social housing ‘through a
resumption of building on a significant scale’ with a commitment to 35,000
new social housing units, over a 6 year period, while also committing to
support up to 75,000 households through an enhanced private rental sector
using the private rental subsidy Housing Assistance Payment (HAP), a pilot
of which had commenced that year. By 2016 Rebuilding Ireland (DHPLG,
2016) consolidated dependence on the market to deliver private rental
accommodation to cover both non-social and social housing with HAP now
the primary social housing mechanism. Access to private rental accommo-
dation is more difficult in the context of a growing gap between state
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housing support rent limits and market rents. Under the new HAP, main-
streamed over 2014–2017, eligible households source their own accommo-
dation in the relatively insecure private rented sector and make their own
tenancy agreement with the landlord. Vulnerable low-income families
prefer the security of tenure offered in more traditional social housing. HAP
housing does not satisfy social housing need or the right to housing. HAP is
an insecure form of housing reliant on private rental leases, tenants are vul-
nerable to eviction (Hearne & Murphy, 2018). They not only experience dis-
crimination but cannot compete for a HAP tenancy in a tight private rental
market increasingly exposed to a financialised global economy (Norris &
Byrne, 2016) Tight private market supply and rising rents caused an increased
loss of tenancies especially among low-income households, contributing to
the new phenomena of family homelessness (Hearne & Murphy, 2018).
HAP also provides a second significant pathway to marketisation in the
form of a €500million pa corporate subsidy to private landlords, which
Burke Kennedy estimates amounts to an estimated €3b per annum subsidy
over the next five years by 2021 (2017). The Irish Government Economic
and Evaluation Service (2017) determined HAP does not return value for
money in the context of tight housing market supply. Use of HAP and marke-
tised delivery of social housing has to be placed in the context of the degree
to which financialisation of housing and property was a key strategy of the
Irish state to deal with the 2008 financial and property crash. These subsidies
function to enable landlords survive high levels of mortgage arrears for buy-
to-lets and keep many landlords afloat, thus shoring up Ireland’s financial
institutions and economic model. Various government policies have proac-
tively encouraged investors and speculators, global equity investor, vulture
funds, and Real Estate Investment Funds (REITS), to invest in distressed Irish
housing and property and related loans (Hearne, 2017). In order to ‘facilitate
the attraction of foreign investment capital to the Irish property market’ gov-
ernment made REIT rental profits exempt from corporation tax in 2013
(Noonan, 2013). Rental subsidies also provide an economic floor for insti-
tutional investors, guaranteeing a base line return on investment, thus reinfor-
cing the profitability of the Irish private housing market as a site for
international investors and contributing significantly to the dynamic of
house price increases, IRES (REIT) for example demonstrate a 7% return on
investment in one property portfolio of 27 units in Hansfield West Dublin all
of which have been rented to previously homeless tenants accessing HAP.
Investor purchases amounted to 38% of all buyers in the first quarter of
2017, up from just 21% in 2010 (Hearne, 2017).
A third pathway to marketisation has been the increased use of SLA’s to
fund delivery of homeless services by housing associations, non-government
organisations (NGO’s) and charities. As elsewhere use of SLAs is associated
with greater use of managerial governance techniques which, over time,
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shift the culture and modus operandi of housing and other NGO’s. Interviews
reveal that historically the approach was to price the homeless service SLA’s
below the economic cost of the service with homeless providers competing
on non-cost sectors and implicitly agreeing to cross subsidise the delivery
of the service. New business models mean that this traditional commissioning
model has evolved as some NGOs have moved into a process of competitive
bidding wars for contracts that are already priced below cost, a clear case of a
race to the bottom. A second feature of SLA’s has been the curtailment or out-
right prohibition of advocacy by funded organisations. Interviews suggest
that, for some, this led over time to an inhibition or suppression of campaign-
ing, which in turn caused new dynamics or tensions between these NGO’s and
housing activists and social movements, albeit some homeless organisations
are also strong advocates.
In labour activation reforms were largely implemented, quasi-markets for
PES (Job Path) have been established, and SICAP procurement processes
are well into their second cycle, however it is not clear how or whether
these reforms have contributed to falling unemployment. Conversely while
HAP is now the primary social housing vehicle social housing targets have
not been reached and market derived forms of social housing have been
insufficient to resolve homelessness. To discuss further the similarities and
differences between the pathways and different experiences of marketisation
in the two sectors in the next three sections we use the 3I’s framework to
compare the interaction of institutions, ideas, and interests across the two
sectors.
5. International, national and local institutions
Institutions are ‘the formal and informal rules, norms, precedents, and organ-
isational factors that structure political behaviour’ (Pomey et al., 2010). The
governance and institutional policy framework for activation differed from
housing in a number of respects and these differences are evident at inter-
national, national and local levels.
The Irish political institutional context is a policy culture aligned to pro-
gressive incrementalism and consensus policy making. Implementation
paralysis is common, often policy does not translate into practice. Ireland
has a centralised governance structure with a strong cabinet and weak parlia-
ment, and Irish local government is among the weakest in Europe. The Pro-
portional Representation Single Transferable Vote electoral system is
associated with a localist and clientalistic political culture which, at least
until the crisis, was dominated by a 2.5 party system of centrist parties.
Ireland has a number of veto points including a bicameral parliament, a cor-
poratist type social partnership and a written constitution. However despite a
written constitution, it only weakly articulates social and economic rights to
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work or housing so that in legal terms Irish welfare rights are relatively residual
(Bentgsson, 2001). One of the first consequences of the crisis was the 2009 col-
lapse of existing national wage agreements, following which Ireland’s social
partnership institutions were formally dissolved in 2011, to some degree
removing traditional veto points from the policy infrastructure. However per-
sonal networks and relationships (some two decades long) survived andmain-
tained a policy consensus during this period and public sector binding
arbitration mechanisms were is use. Power was to a large degree centralised
over the period of crisis with the Trioka working through the Economic Man-
agement Council, (comprised of Ministers of Public Expenditure and Reform,
Finance, the Prime Minister (Taoiseach) and Deputy Prime Minister (Tánaiste)).
Pathways to Work, the main PES policy document, was largely a domestic
initiative but was institutionally embedded in the Troika programme (Ireland,
2010) with quarterly targets and well-defined implementation metrics. DSP
reported implementation progress to a new institution, the Labour Market
Council established in 2013 (LMC, 2014). With no local government role in
delivering policy, there was a strong top-down vertical governance. Decision
making was enacted at cabinet level and its implementation monitored
through a cabinet subcommittee, interviews suggest the Taoiseach’s and
Tánaiste’s leadership was considered crucial.
The governance and institutional policy framework for Rebuilding Ireland, Ire-
land’s main housing strategy, differed substantially as the core annual national
targets for both social housing and private rental sector subsidies and their
delivery was dependant on local authorities and housing associations. This
suggests the domestic institutional actors such as the Department of Housing
and the Government was key in marketisation policies. While the HAP targets
have largely been met thus far in terms of accessing social housing from the
private rental sector, theminimal social house building targets set out in Rebuld-
ing Ireland have not been met. Local authorities, reeling from austerity era
budget cuts and recruitment embargos, had little capacity to meet targets.
Housing construction requires a significant lead-in time to develop resources,
staffing and administrative systems, such that targets have not been met and
implementation remains slow and inconsistent. Despite the post-2013 econ-
omic recovery, capital funding for direct social housing building by local auth-
orities and housing associations continued to be restrained by central
government who in turn are restrained by EU fiscal rules. While the Rebuilding
Ireland targets are reported to national parliament the post-2016 minority gov-
ernment is arguably less cohesive than the previous unified government which
showed strong leadership implementing activation reforms.
The EU Open Method of Co-ordination has had some influence on national
employment policies (De la Porte & Pochet, 2012). The Troika’s interest in acti-
vation policy had two significant domestic impacts. The first was the prioriti-
sation of activation reforms amongst the domestic political elite and a clear
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politically relevant reporting cycle. The second, a dampening of the power of
domestic veto points and players that overcame a strong Irish tendency
towards ‘policy implementation paralyses. Interviews with senior civil servants
suggest it is in implementation rather than the initiation or design of acti-
vation reforms that the influence of the international is most powerful. In con-
trast the Troika influence on social housing policy is largely filtered through
activation reforms which sought to remove poverty traps through the new
HAP private rental sector subsidy. There is little evidence of direct inter-
national input into housing policy. Housing is not an EU competence and
the EC Social Investment Package homeless analysis is largely invisible in
the policy process. However, European Central Bank lending rules and
overall fiscal policy expenditure thresholds do partially impact on, and are
used by the government to legitimate, the lack of investment in capital
funding for social housing.
6. Interests
Interests refer to ‘agendas of societal groups, elected officials, civil servants,
researchers, and policy entrepreneurs’ (Pomey et al., 2010, p. 709). Because
welfare state projects are often explained as outcomes of left-dominated gov-
ernments we start by examining Irish political cleavages. Ireland was tradition-
ally a two and half party system with a pro-business Fine Gael (FG), a populist
Fianna Fail and small Labour Party (LP) but the crisis caused a significant frac-
turing of the old system without yet creating a clear new cleavage. FG, in
power for the whole of the period under review are associated with light regu-
lation, low tax competition, and ideological orientation towards privatisation
and a more conditional approach to social policy. In power with Labour since
2011, FG suffered a resounding electoral defeat in 2016 losing 26 of its 77
seats. However FG retained power in a minority government propped up
by independents and a confidence and supply agreement with the second
largest party FF. FF regard themselves as a republican party, they had been
in power for the fifteen years leading up to the economic crisis and were deci-
mated in the 2011 General Election. Entering the 2016 general election with a
‘fairness’ rhetoric but a policy platform consistent with a neoliberal political
economy model, they regained enough seats to become the second largest
party and enter the confidence and supply agreement in 2016 (effectively
acting as government and opposition).
Somewhat counter-intuitively the Irish left has not fared well over the crisis
and experienced a redistribution of votes within the left more than a move-
ment of votes to the left, as well as a shift in votes to a number of new left
political actors including independent (non-party) representatives. The
Labour Party, the junior 2011–2016 coalition partner, having directly
implemented cuts that hurt vulnerable groups, lost 25 of its 32 remaining
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seats (a new party, the Social Democrats returned their existing 3 seats in
2016). Other left parties gained from alignment with the anti-austerity social
movement, the Right2Water campaign, which emerged in 2014. These
included, Sinn Fein, a nationalist republican party which increased its seats
from 14 to 23. The radical United Left Alliance who entered the 2011 parlia-
ment with seven seats, after a number of splits and defections, registered
as a political party AAA-PBP and won 6 seats in the 2016 GE. The net short-
term effect of this political and social turbulence has been the dominance
of the centre-right in government and, various interviews suggest, an ideo-
logical shift towards marketisation. The continued fractured existence of the
left and new social movements means a potentially less coherent opposition
to marketisation albeit various interviews point to the success of the water
movement, and by 2018 there is significant mobilisation and civil society
coalition building opposing marketisation in housing and advocating the
right to housing. With regard to activation policy we see some debate and
nuance but less real policy difference between the various national policy
and political actors (Oireachtas, 2015), albeit interviews suggest some senior
civil servants privately resist what they consider an ‘imposition’, as do some
policy experts who tried to raise objections to JobPath through NESC. Social
partnership remains officially stood down but social partners were rep-
resented on the Labour Market Council (albeit employers have significantly
more representation than trade unions suggesting shifts in power over the
crisis). Political actors are relatively consistent over the period, trade union
resistance to JobPath privatisation was negotiated through public sector arbi-
tration systems. Community resitance to commissioing SICAP led to the sig-
nificant reshaping of the second round of commissing and a more
restricted quasi-market. Negative political impact associated with activation
appears limited to self-inflicted wounds associated with JobBridge, a labour
market internship and reforms to make lone parent payments conditional.
While we see some civil society, media and movement protest against
increased conditionality and JobPath, up to 2018 this has had little discernible
impact on activation policy, albeit in February 2019 a parliamentary motion to
abolish JobPath was passed and we see strong reaction to proposals to
extend Pay by Results tenders to LESN and Job Clubs.
With regard to social housing, powerful international financial and property
interests influenced and promoted a heavily marketised and increasingly
financialised housing policy limiting rent controls, encouraging use of PPPs,
and relaxing building regulations (Hearne, 2017). The private sector profited
from maintaining the dominant position of the market as the preferred mech-
anism to deliver social housing. Despite strong policy inputs (NESC, 2013; Rey-
nolds, 2017; Sirr, 2017), and despite powerful agency emerging to advocate
for housing rights, power inequalities dominate housing policy. Government
has resisted a 2013 Economic and Social Rights campaign which successfully
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brought their case for a constitutional right to housing through the 2015 Con-
stitutional Convention. Instead policy continues to conservatively interpret
the right to property in the 1937 Irish constitution as a veto on progressive
housing regulation which might provide greater security of tenure. Providers
of homeless services are, under the terms of their service delivery agreements
or SLA’s nuanced in advocacy about housing policy. Nonetheless a wider
rental crisis (increases of 65% from 2013 to 2017), and a dramatic increase
of family homelessness since 2014, has led various actors to more forcefully
contest the state’s over-reliance on the private market. From 2015 small
local grassroots housing action groups and campaigns such as the Home
Sweet Home campaign in December 2016 have captured public imagination,
a 2016 trade union supported campaign for ‘fair and secure rents’, while by
late 2018 both Take Back the City and Raise the Roof were mobilising and con-
testing marketisation and articulating alternative rights-based narratives.
7. Ideologies
Ideas influence not only how problems are understood but also what policy
alternatives, if any, are considered feasible (Pomey et al., 2010). Grover
(2015) alerts us that involvement of the private sector is often framed by pol-
itical and ideological discourse which promotes concepts of private, markets
and individual or personal responsibility.
In general public discourse of both domestic and international actors
reinforced the domestic preference for spending cuts over alternative
avenues of increased revenue. However there are differences in timing.
Earlier activation policy reforms parallel a period of strong international
pressure and concentration of domestic power in the context of loan condi-
tionality under the Troika, whose presence enabled Irish governments to
implement unpopular reforms. Housing reforms were slower to evolve and
were deliberated on and developed in a more domestic arena, without
such a strong international input or context. At the same time, the power of
the supervisory role of the European Central Bank is evident in fiscal rules lim-
iting government borrowing, the discourse associated with austerity politi-
cally and practically limited development of policy alternatives.
In both sectors we see strong support for and discourse of marketisation,
commissioning and procurement. However we find different experiences of
opening up to markets. In the case of activation the state is still the primary
delivery mechanism but is increasingly legitimating and using pay-by-
results mechanisms to outsource specific services. Such privatisation occurred
under the radar and by stealth, without significant public protest (Murphy,
2015). Dail and Oireachtas committee debates reference new public manage-
ment language including commissioning, coherence and efficiencies however
by late 2018 there is more focus on negative aspects of JobPath including
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sanctions and treatment of claimants. In contrast the attempt to marketise
social housing has been over the radar, this policy orientation is sustained
by a powerful political and media meta narrative that at once makes the
market seem an inevitable and natural presence in social housing provision.
Despite the reality that it fails to deliver housing outcomes we find the prefer-
ence for marketisation of social housing is cognitively locked within state insti-
tutions and government (Niemelä & Saarinen, 2012).
Public discourse also stigmatises claimants in both policy sectors. We see
low key, but successful and significant shifts away from rights. Activation
policy uses profiling and algorithms to target PES, alongside greater appli-
cation of new sanctions and penalties and rules of engagement which
require unemployed people to live in state of flex-insecurity. Homeless
people are obliged to self-accommodate and obtain their own solutions to
homelessness and to cope with increased insecurity, competition and discrimi-
nation associated with the shift from social housing to private rental housing
tenure. With regard to activation the discourse has been one of Work-First Acti-
vation, and a broad anti-welfare and fraud control discourse had evolved
under Labour Party leadership of DSP but increased considerably under Fine
Gael leadership of DSP, albeit not to the level of the British tabloid press.
The housing meta-narrative is mixed but sometimes injects elements of mor-
ality into public discourse where those who cannot access housing are made
bear blame for market and policy failure. A creeping domestic-led discourse
increasingly stigmatises those risk of homelessness questioning whether
homeless families are ‘gaming the system’ to secure social housing. As with
activation conditionality, the purpose of such discourse is to impose self-regu-
lation, families have to successfully compete in the private market for what
were once housing rights (Boland & Griffin, 2015; Darmon & Perez, 2011).
Ireland demonstrates capacity for double think and strategic ambiguity in
political discourse, where expressions of neo-liberal policy preferences have
tended to be ‘concealed, piecemeal, serendipitous, pragmatic and consensual’
(Kitchin, O’Callaghan, Boyle, Gleeson, & Keaveney, 2012, p. 1306), leading to
privatisation by stealth. However the scale of the water movement challenged
the dominant hegemonic neoliberal consensus, showing potential for a more
engaged citizenry who had a strong preference for the state-led provision of
water services. While SLA’s in third sector employment services and non-profit
housing providers have a potentially chilling impact on advocacy, the recent
articulation of rights-based claims in opposition to housing marketisation are
evidence of alternative public discourse.
8. Discussion
The complex range of explanatory factors discussed below are best under-
stood with the aid of the ‘3Is’ framework which is used below to anchor
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issues as diverse as financial speculation, protest, the influence of domestic as
well as international actors. We also draw attention here to the importance of
examining timing within theories of policy change (Table 2).
While the ideational preference of the state for marketisaiton is consistent
across the two sectors (Murphy & Dukelow, 2016), there is a clear difference in
the scale and type of marketisation pathways in the two sectors, with conse-
quences for the state’s capacity to control implementation of policy objec-
tives. While there are some experiences in common, for example the
chilling impact of use of SLA’s to fund NGOs, we find in particular that the
extent of financial speculation in the Irish housing market compromises the
states capacity to meet social housing need through the private sector. We
find less direct financial speculation in the Irish PES but recognise that
private recruitment services have capacity to shape the states labour
market policy capacity.
The Irish government engaged with activation and social housing reforms
in the context of loan conditionality under a Troika bailout, however we find
considerable government autonomy in policy design and scope in both policy
areas. The 2009 collapse of existing national wage agreements and Ireland’s
Table 2. Comparative black box framework: labour activation & social housing reforms.
Institutions Activation (Intreo/JobPath) Social housing rental subsidies
Key variables
Governance and
institutional policy
frame
Pathways to Work
Quarterly targets, metrics, Report to
Labour Market Council
No local government
Vertical and horizontal governance
protocols
Social Housing Strategy 2020 Support,
Supply and Reform (2014) Rebuilding
Ireland
Annual National Targets, Report to
national parliament
Local government implementation,
weak capacity
International
institutions
Troika target, OCED analysis, EU CSR’s SIP homeless analysis invisible
Interests
Political parties
Corporate actors
protest NGO/SM
Indirect corporate actors (LMC)
No Social Movement
Oireachtas Committee, little
differentiation by political parties
NGO’s as service delivery, weak and
little impact
No direct corporate actors but
significant corporate influence
Small scale Social Movements
Oireachtas Committee influence,
some difference between political
parties.
NGO’s as service delivery, mixed
policy impact
International interests EU and OCED relevant to policy
learning and Troika implementation
REITS as lobby
Ideas
Debate/discourse
rights
Work-First Activation, Anti-welfare,
fraud control, Sanctions and
Penalties, shift from rights
Housing ‘Crisis’
Frame of Right to housing, to home,
to city
Hubs, licences, institutionalisation
Debate/discourse
marketisation
State primary, targets pay-by-results,
commissioning, value for money
Home ownership, private property,
market recovery, market primary
mechanism
Global capital and finance
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social partnership institutions removed vetoes making it easier to implement
activation reforms, while social housing policy was less a central issue for pay
bargaining. Ireland is now more highly centralised and stakeholders tend to
impact reform agendas in the national policy context, where small policy com-
munities maintain a policy consensus and, as interviews suggest, a degree of
group-think. Local government were implementation actors in social housing
policy while they were largely irrelevant to activation implementation. There
appears alignment between all international, administrative and political
elites but more so about the direction of labour activation than housing
policy which is under a more sustained critique.
There was some political cost associated with two relatively peripheral acti-
vation issues and by 2019 JobPath and issues of privatisation are more often
articulated as a public concern. Given the focus of the left over the years
2013–2016 has been on water policy, social housing policy has not been as
salient an electoral issue as it might appear to be but this is likely to
change in the next election, particularly as parties come under pressure
from new housing grassroots movements with growing levels of protest
about the role of the market in social housing and homeless policy.
Four factors appear most salient in explaining differences in implemen-
tation. Centralised power structures enabled a more consistent implemen-
tation of activation policy than private rental subsidy reform which was
unevenly implemented across different local authorities. Where the two
differed substantially was in the institutional architecture for implementation,
with activation implemented from the top down through a highly centralised
management team with a clear vertical line management. Social Housing
build and acquisition targets were on other hand implemented (or not) by
local authorities who reported to a central Department of Housing. Given
their nature, housing reforms are also were slower to implement, driven
through predominantly local domestic processes, they experience more dom-
estic and local vetoes and are subject to a strong Irish tendency towards
‘policy implementation paralysis’. Furthermore, capital spending for social
housing was subject to drastic cuts in austerity reflecting not only fiscal
rules, but also neoliberal support for marketisation of social housing policy.
A second point of departure in the policy infrastructure was the role of
international actors including the Troika. International led policy learning or
persuasion is evident in the activation policy field but international actors
were ‘pushing on an open door’ (Dukelow, 2016) and, interviews suggest,
were selectively amplified by domestic actors seeking room to manoeuvre
to reshape activation policy. Activation reforms were facilitated by Troika
implementation targets and reporting systems within a clear politically rel-
evant reporting cycle. While the new rental subsidy HAP evolved in the
context of the Troika the implementation period began after the Troika’s
departure with housing policy targets developed after the Troika departed.
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The third explanatory factor might be also be down to timing, this time in the
domestic political system. Activation reforms were implemented in the
context of strong national government while housing reforms suffered from
the political turbulence of a minority coalition government, albeit one com-
mitted to all forms of marketisation. A fourth and most weighty explanatory
factor appears to be the model and scale of marketisation and the degree
to which it relates to financialisation. In activation policy we see a constricted
creation of quasi-markets, limited to €165m per annum and across both profit
and not for profit actors, albeit we acknowledge an underexplored private
market for employment services which has lobbying power and practical
capacity to influence the trajectory of the Irish labour market. In social
housing we see a much more expansive forms of marketisation which is
embedded in financialisation with potential benefits of €1bn pa corporate
subsidies through the HAP and a range of government funding, tax and leg-
islative supports. While the state worked hard to entice international private
actors into both markets it ultimately has more control over the form of con-
tracted engagement in activation services than in the wild-west world of
powerful residential capitalism. It is beyond the political capacity or desire
of the state to regulate and tame powerful international housing actors to
work in the interests of Irish society.
9. Conclusion
This paper used a 3I’s framework to trace key ideas, institutions and interests
and to isolate the dynamic informing two key policy decisions over the period
2010–2016. We conclude with some observations on the use of the 3I’s frame-
work which used three variables institutions, interests and ideologies to focus
on similarities and differences between the two policies. While the 3I’s frame-
work proved useful in anchoring a wide range of variables it may be useful to
think about how, in particular, international variables including the resource
and ideational power of finance might be more fully built into the model.
Having briefly sketched an overview of Irish political and policy architecture
the paper largely compared two policies from a key point of policy formu-
lation and tried to take the process through to policy implementation. This
was more challenging than a strict ‘point in time’ comparison and two limit-
ations are apparent. The interaction of the three variables will shift across the
different stages of the policy cycle and this needs to be adequately factored
into the analysis, for example local authorities may not be involved in the
inception of the HAP but are involved in its implementation. Likewise the
timing of the policy reform episode seems crucial. Pathways to Work, was
implemented from 2012, in a period of strong united government and
during the active Troika reporting schedule, senior public servants used this
to traction to implement targets and resources. While only one year later,
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HAP is implemented by a minority government and appears to suffer from an
absence of leadership and traction. These caveats aside, the findings in this
article are of broader international and comparative relevance and demon-
strate the complex relationship between ‘policy and politic’. The comparative
methodology facilitates a range of useful insights into the experiences of
sector-specific pathways to privatisation with potential lessons for both
policy makers and political actors. While we find evidence of inceasing resist-
ance, we also find that different pathways to marketisation make it more
difficult to observe the common trends across these policies, this makes it
more difficult to join the dots and make connections across different policy
areas, potentially making resistance less successful.
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